1 Key Revocation Based on Dirichlet Multinomial Model for Mobile Ad Hoc Networks by Xinxin Fan & Guang Gong
1
Key Revocation Based on Dirichlet Multinomial
Model for Mobile Ad Hoc Networks
Xinxin Fan, and Guang Gong, Member, IEEE
Abstract—The absence of an online trusted authority makes
the issue of key revocation in mobile ad hoc networks (MANETs)
particularly challenging. In this paper, we present a novel self-
organized key revocation scheme based on the Dirichlet multi-
nomial model and identity-based cryptography (IBC). Our key
revocation scheme offers a theoretically sound basis for a node in
MANETs to predict the behavior of other nodes based on its own
observations and reports from peers. In our scheme, each node
keeps track of three categories of behavior deﬁned and classiﬁed
by an external trusted authority, and updates its knowledge
about other nodes’ behavior with 3-dimension Dirichlet distribu-
tion. Differentiating between suspicious behavior and malicious
behavior enables nodes to make multilevel response by either
revoking keys of malicious nodes or ceasing the communication
with suspicious nodes for some time to gather more information
for making further decision. Furthermore, we also analyze the
attack-resistant properties of our key revocation scheme through
extensive simulations in the presence of independent and collusive
adversaries, respectively.
Index Terms—Mobile ad hoc networks, security, key revoca-
tion, identity-based cryptography, Dirichlet multinomial model.
I. INTRODUCTION
W
ITH the rapid development in network technology, in
particular wireless communication, the traditional cen-
tralized, ﬁxed networks cannot satisfy enormous demands on
network connectivity, data storage and information exchange
any longer. New types of communication networks based
on wireless and multi-hop communication have emerged to
provide efﬁcient solutions for the growing number of mobile
wireless applications and services. A large family of the
new types of wireless communication networks can be best
represented by mobile ad hoc networks (MANETs). MANETs
provide a relative new paradigm of wireless networking, in
which all networking functions (e.g., control, routing, moni-
toring, mobility management, etc.) are performed by the nodes
themselves in a decentralized manner. Security support is in-
dispensable in order for these networks and related services to
be implemented in both military and commercial applications.
However, due to the absence of infrastructure, insecure nature
of the wireless communication medium and dynamic changes
of the network topology, MANETs are vulnerable to a range
of attacks and are thus difﬁcult to secure [1], [5]. In this paper,
we address the key revocation, one of the most important
and challenging issues for the key management in MANETs.
Although a number of schemes have been proposed for the key
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management in MANETs [9], [18], [24], [28]–[30], only a few
of literature explicitly address the issue of the key revocation,
see [2], [12], [18], [21], [24], [29] for example.
Revoking cryptographic keys or certiﬁcates of malicious
nodes is crucial for the security and robustness of MANETs.
Namely, good nodes can isolate malicious ones from the
network by ceasing the further communication with them
and ignoring any message received from them. Therefore, if
cryptographic keys or certiﬁcates are issued by an authority, it
must possible, whenever necessary (e.g., key compromise), for
the authority to revoke them, and essentially evict malicious
nodes from the network. In the context of wired networks,
implementations of key revocation schemes are usually based
on Public Key Infrastructures (PKIs). When the certiﬁcate of
some user is to be revoked, the certiﬁcate authority (CA) adds
user’s certiﬁcate information into a Certiﬁcate Revocation List
(CRL) and puts it on an on-line trusted public repository or dis-
tributes it to other relevant users in some secure way. However,
these conventional techniques are difﬁcult to be applied to
MANETs because of a number of unique features of MANETs
such as the absence of an on-line CA and a centralized
repository. Two categories of solutions have been proposed
for the key revocation in MANETs and each of them can be
implemented with the certiﬁcate-based cryptography (CBC)
or identity-based cryptography (IBC). In the ﬁrst category
of solutions, a trusted third party (TTP) distributes the trust
over some or all network nodes using threshold cryptography,
thereby letting these nodes take over the responsibility of key
revocation in MANETs. Although this kind of key revocation
schemes do not require the establishment of any infrastructure,
the use of threshold cryptography may cause tremendous
computation and communication overhead on the network.
Meanwhile, the second category of solutions are fully self-
organized, in which a TTP loads public key certiﬁcates (in
CBC schemes) or private keys (in IBC schemes) for nodes
before they join the network. Each node has its own view about
the network and decides whether certiﬁcates or private keys of
other nodes should be revoked based on its own observations
and the information collected from peers in MANETs. Our
key revocation scheme proposed in this paper belongs to this
category.
We note that the key revocation procedure involves obser-
vations and interactions among nodes. Therefore, it is closely
related to reputation and trust of nodes in the network. This
observation allows us to design a key revocation scheme
based on the decentralized reputation system. Reputation
systems have been investigated extensively in the past and
used successfully in many commercial online applications2
[17]. They provide a mechanism for rating participants of
transactions by having buyers and sellers compute each other
reputation scores, and therefore stimulate good behavior as
well as sanction bad behavior. In the context of MANETs,
reputation systems have emerged as a promising mechanism
for ensuring cooperation and fairness, and thwarting node
failures and malicious attacks [6], [8], [19]. However, the
previous reputation systems all classify the behavior of nodes
in MANETs as either good or bad without any intermediate
state. Such a binary behavior differentiation omits the actual
cause and the degree of the misbehavior. Note that some
misbehavior may just happen accidently (for example, a node
cannot forward packages due to temporary congestion of the
network) and last only for a short time. When a node shows
this kind of accidental misbehavior, it might not mean that the
node has been compromised by an attacker. Therefore, in this
case it is more reasonable to keep collecting information about
the behavior of this node instead of immediately characterizing
it as malicious and excluding it from the network.
To provide more ﬂexibility and precision for nodes analyz-
ing peers’ behavior and making different response based on
results of the analysis, we present a novel self-organized key
revocation scheme based on IBC and Dirichlet multinomial
model in this contribution. In our scheme, depending on dif-
ferent application scenarios, an external TTP classiﬁes nodes’
behavior into three categories during the network initialization
phase, namely good behavior, suspicious behavior, and mali-
cious behavior. Each node keeps track of peers’ behavior with
a neighborhood watch scheme or by analyzing other nodes’
reports, and then updates its own knowledge about peers’
behavior with 3-dimensional Dirichlet distribution and makes
the corresponding response. Furthermore, a deviation test is
employed to ﬁlter potentially false statements from adversaries
and Dampster-Shafer belief theory [25] is used to integrate
other nodes’ reports. While a node revokes the keys of nodes
showing malicious behavior once enough evidence has been
collected, it also shields itself from suspicious behavior of
peers by ceasing the communication with them and continue
gathering information for further decisions.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: Section II
reviews existing solutions and describes the motivation for our
work. Section III gives a short introduction to mathematical
tools used in this paper including cryptographic pairings
and Dirichlet multinomial model. Section IV formulates the
network and security models and presents our design goals.
Section V gives a detailed description of our key revocation
scheme, followed by simulations and analysis of our key re-
vocation scheme under false statement attacks by independent
and collusive adversaries in Section VI. This paper is ﬁnally
concluded in Section VII.
II. RELATED WORK AND MOTIVATION
In this section, we brieﬂy review previous work about the
key revocation and reputation systems in MANETs, restricting
our attention to the schemes which are more relevant to our
work. We also describe the motivation that leads to the design
of our protocol at the end. In the following discussions, N
denotes the overall number of network nodes, and t and n are
two positive integers satisfying t · n < N.
A. Key Revocation Schemes in MENETs
The seminal paper by Zhou and Hass [30] introduced
the idea of using (t;n)-threshold cryptography to implement
distributed CAs (D-CAs) in MANETs. Although the authors
mentioned that the D-CAs can collaborate to revoke certiﬁ-
cates of malicious nodes, no algorithms about the certiﬁcate
revocation are described.
Luo et al. [18] presented a certiﬁcate revocation scheme
based on CBC and (t;N)-threshold cryptography. In their
scheme, each node monitors the behavior of its one-hop
neighboring nodes and disseminates its signed accusations
to its m-hop neighborhoods upon observing any malicious
behavior, where m is a design parameter denoting the range of
the accusation propagation. All nodes receiving the accusation
information verify whether the accuser can be trusted and up-
date their CRLs accordingly. When the number of accusations
for some node exceeds a predeﬁned revocation threshold, the
certiﬁcate of that node will be revoked. Similar idea is also
implemented with IBC in [24].
Zhang et al. [29] designed a novel key management mecha-
nism called IKM for MANETs by combining IBC and thresh-
old cryptography. In their key revocation protocol, each node
observing misbehavior of other nodes securely sends its signed
accusations to preassigned Distributed Private Key Generators
(D-PKGs). When the number of accusations reaches the revo-
cation threshold in a predetermined time window, t D-PKGs
collaborate to revoke keys of malicious nodes based on an
ID-based (t;n)-threshold signature scheme.
The above schemes use threshold cryptography and there-
fore some nodes need to collaborate to revoke keys of mali-
cious nodes, whereas several fully self-organized scheme are
also proposed in the literature. Moore et al. [21] introduced the
concept of suicide for solving the credential revocation in self-
organizing systems. The basic idea is extremely simple: when
a node observes the misbehavior of another node, it simply
broadcasts a signed message claiming both of them to be dead.
Their scheme can fast isolate the malicious nodes from the
network and is ideally suited to highly mobile networks or
special-purpose MANETs.
Arboit et al. [2] proposed a self-organized certiﬁcate revo-
cation protocol that is based on a weighted accusation scheme
and provides protection against potentially false accusation
attacks. The authors presented a method for actually quan-
tifying the trustworthiness of nodes in MANETs satisfying
that accusations from trustworthy nodes have higher weight
than those from less trustworthy nodes. All accusations are
frequently broadcasted throughout the entire network. The
certiﬁcate of a node is revoked when the sum of the weighted
accusations against that node is equal to or greater than a
conﬁgurable threshold.
Hoeper and Gong [12] presented a self-organized key re-
vocation scheme for MANETs. In their scheme, each node
uses a neighborhood watch scheme to monitor other nodes’
behavior within its communication range. Upon detection of3
misbehavior, these observations are then securely propagated
to m-hop neighborhoods using preshared keys obtained from
a non-interactive ID-based key agreement protocol. The public
key of a node will be revoked if it is accused by at least ±
nodes, where ± is a revocation threshold. Moreover, the authors
also use the majority vote to mitigate the inﬂuence of false
accusations from l-hop neighbors, where 2 · l · m.
B. Reputation Systems in MANETs
Several reputation systems have been proposed in the liter-
ature to cope with malicious behavior of nodes in MANETs
[6], [8], [19]. Much closer to our work is the reputation system
CONFIDANT (Cooperation Of Nodes, Fairness In Dynamic
Ad-hoc NeTworks) proposed by Buchegger and Boudec [6],
[8]. CONFIDANT adopts the classical Bayesian inference
theory and beta-binomial framework for estimating reputations
[10], [14]. Moreover, CONFIDANT includes a deviation test
based on the Bayesian approach to decide whether second-
hand information that a node received from its one-hop neigh-
bors can be trusted, and to mitigate the inﬂuence of potentially
false accusation attacks from malicious nodes.
C. Motivation
As we have mentioned in Section 1, it might be more
reasonable and more precise to analyze and predict nodes’
behavior by differentiating multi-categories of misbehavior
based on their actual cause. In this way, we hope that keys of
good nodes who only misbehave for a short time due to various
reasons will not be immediately revoked by other good nodes.
However, the more categories of malicious behavior, the more
complicated the implementation. Thus, in this paper we only
consider two categories of misbehavior, namely suspicious
behavior and malicious behavior. To establish multi-parameter
Bayesian model for analyzing nodes’ behavior, we employ
Dirichlet reputation systems (DRSs) proposed by Jøsang and
Haller [16] and make some modiﬁcations about the infor-
mation integration based on Dampster-Shafer belief theory.
As a generalization of Beta reputation systems [14], DRSs
can deﬁne any set of discrete rating levels and provide great
ﬂexibility and usability.
III. PRELIMINARIES
In this section, we present a brief introduction to IBC,
bilinear pairing, and Dirichlet multinomial model, which form
the basis of our design in this work. For a detailed treatment,
the reader is referred to references mentioned below.
A. IBC and Bilinear Pairing
The concept of IBC is due to Shamir [26]. In an ID-
based cryptosystem, a user’s public key is an easily calculated
function of his identity, while his private key can be computed
by a TTP. Recently, IBC has been used to design efﬁcient
key management protocols for MANETs [11], [29]. All these
protocols use so-called bilinear pairings. Due to the important
role of bilinear pairings in IBC, we give a brief introduction
about the concept of bilinear pairings below.
Let r be a positive integer. Let G1 and G2 be additively-
written abelian groups of order r with identity O, and let
GT be a multiplicatively-written cyclic group of order r with
identity 1. A bilinear pairing on (G1;G2;GT) is a map
e : G1 £ G2 ! GT
that satisﬁes the following additional properties:
1) Bilinearity: For 8P;P0 2 G1 and 8Q;Q0 2 G2 we have
e(P + P0;Q) = e(P;Q)e(P0;Q) and e(P;Q + Q0) =
e(P;Q)e(P;Q0).
2) Non-degeneracy: For 8P 2 G1 with P 6= O, there is
some Q 2 G2 such that e(P;Q) 6= 1. Furthermore, for
8Q 2 G2 with Q 6= O, there is some P 2 G1 such that
e(P;Q) 6= 1.
3) Computability: e(P;Q) can be efﬁciently computed for
all P 2 G1 and Q 2 G2.
In practice, the abelian groups G1 and G2 are implemented
using a divisor class group on certain (hyper-)elliptic curves
and the cyclic group GT is implemented using a multiplicative
subgroup of a ﬁnite ﬁeld. Most pairing applications rely on
the hardness of the so-called Bilinear Difﬁe-Hellman Problem
(BDHP)1. For more details, the reader is referred to [3].
B. Dirichlet Multinomial Model
Dirichlet multinomila model [10] provides a ﬂexible mech-
anism for constructing reputation system for e-commerce
applications. The basic idea behind DRS [16] is to compute
reputation values by statically updating Dirichlet probability
density function (PDF). Given the a priori reputation values,
the a posteriori reputation value is calculated to increase the
precision of a belief by combining the a priori knowledge and
the new observations.
It is well known that the Dirichlet distribution, often denoted
by Dir(~ ®), is a family of continuous multivariate probability
distributions parameterized by the vector ~ ® of positive reals
which captures a sequence of observations of the possible
outcomes in a state space. The Dirichlet distribution is deﬁned
as follows: Let £ = fµ1;:::;µkg be a state space consisting
of k mutually disjoint events. Let ~ p = (p(µ1);:::;p(µk)) be
a continuous random vector taking values in the k-dimension
simplex4 with the joint PDF
f(~ p j ~ ®) =
¡
³Pk
i=1 ®(µi)
´
Qk
i=1 ¡(®(µi))
k Y
i=1
p(µi)®(µi)¡1;
where ¡(x) =
R 1
0 tx¡1e¡tdt is the Gamma function. Then
~ p is said to have a k-dimension Dirichlet distribution with
parameter vector ~ ® = (®(µ1);:::;®(µk)) (®(µi) ¸ 0 for
i = 1;:::;k). The Dirichlet distribution is the multivariate
generalization of the Beta distribution and the vector of
expectations is a function of the parameters ®(µi). We have
E(p(µi) j ~ ®) =
®(µi)
Pk
i=1 ®(µi)
:
1Let e be a bilinear pairing on (G1;G2;GT). The Bilinear Difﬁe-Hellman
Problem (BDHP) is the following: given P;P1 = [a]P;P2 = [b]P 2
G1;Q 2 G2 such that e(p;Q) 6= 1, compute e([ab]P;Q).
4The k-dimension simplex is such that if ~ p = (p(µ1);:::;p(µk)) then
p(µi) ¸ 0 and
Pk
i=1 p(µi) = 1.4
Since the Dirichlet distribution is a conjugate priori of the
multinomial distribution, the posteriori distribution is also
Dirichlet and can be calculated as follows [16]:
f(~ p j ~ r;~ a) =
¡
³Pk
i=1 r(µi) + Ca(µi)
´
Qk
i=1 ¡(r(µi) + Ca(µi))
k Y
i=1
p(µi)(r(µi)+Ca(µi)¡1); (1)
where a(µi) is a base rate vector over the state space £
satisfying a(µi) ¸ 0 and
Pk
i=1 a(µi) = 1, C is a priori
constant which is equal to the cardinality of the state space
over which a uniform distribution is assumed (C is usually set
to 2), and the vector r(µi) is a posteriori evidence over the
state space £. Given the Dirichlet distribution of Eq.(1), the
probability expectation of any of the k varaiables can now be
written as:
E(p(µi) j ~ r;~ a) =
r(µi) + Ca(µi)
C +
Pk
i=1 r(µi)
:
For more details about Dirichlet reputation systems, the reader
is referred to [10], [16].
IV. SYSTEM MODELS AND DESIGN GOALS
In this section, we formulate the network model and the
security model as well as design assumptions and goals.
A. Network Model
We consider a general MANET consisting of an uncon-
strained number of networking nodes with a random mobility
pattern, i.e., nodes moving independently within a given ﬁeld
or keeping stationary in a location for a period of time. In
addition, the network topology also changes dynamically when
a particular network event, such as node join, leave or failure,
occurs. Each node has limited transmission and reception
capabilities. Mobile nodes that are within each other’s radio
range communicate directly via bandwidth-constrained, error-
prone insecure wireless links, while those that are far apart rely
on other nodes to relay their messages in a multi-hop fashion.
As requirements of many network tasks and protocols, each
node must be unambiguously identiﬁed by a unique identity.
It can be a MAC address or an IP address.
In order for nodes monitoring various behavior of their
direct neighbors within the communication range, we assume
that communication links are bidirectional in the network
and nodes are in promiscuous mode. Both assumptions are
common in many low-layer MANETs protocols such as DSR
[15] and AODV [23] routing protocols. Furthermore, for
disseminating accusation messages securely with IBC in our
key revocation scheme, we assume that nodes know identities
of their neighbors up to m-hop (m is a design parameter
denoting the range of the accusation propagation). Identiﬁers
of neighbor nodes can be obtained by running some neigh-
borhood discovery protocols, which are part of many existing
routing protocols and therefore can be reused. Moreover, we
also assume that embedded processors of mobile nodes can
perform public-key algorithms related to IBC. We would like
to point out that all the above assumptions are quite common
and reasonable for most application scenarios of MANETs.
Hence, our design does not introduce additional burdens into
the network.
B. Security Model
We term as an adversary or attacker any node whose
behavior deviates from the legitimate MANET protocols. We
assume that each node in MANET is installed an Intrusion
Detection System [20] which can detect predeﬁned misbehav-
ior of nodes. The main purpose of a key revocation scheme is
to revoke keys of malicious nodes and ﬁnally isolates them
from the network. Most previous schemes [18], [24], [29]
are vulnerable to potentially false statement attacks in which
malicious nodes accuse other nodes in a MANET at their
own will. Therefore, we need to evaluate the inﬂuence of
false statement attacks mounted by malicious nodes on our
key revocation scheme in details. The analysis of other types
of attacks aimed at the different layers of MANETs, though
important, is out of the scope of this work.
The false accusation attack can be independently or col-
laboratively initiated by some adversaries. We consider the
following two attack scenarios in this paper:
1) Attack by independent adversaries: in this attack
scenario, each adversary independently chooses attack
targets and propagates false accusations against victims
through the network in order to accelerate keys of target
nodes to be revoked by other nodes in the MANET.
Note that in this case it is possible that an adversary
also accuse other adversaries, except for accusing well-
behaving nodes.
2) Attack by collusive adversaries: in this attack scenario,
collusive adversaries know each other and they choose
one or several well-behaving nodes as common attack
objects. These adversaries always report positive obser-
vations about their friends and negative ones about the
chosen victims. In this way, the adversaries can not only
prolong their lifetime in the MANET, but also speed up
the procedure of revoking keys of the victims.
Furthermore, we also assume that adversaries always attempt
to maximize their inﬂuence by propagating extremely positive
or extremely negative observations to the network. Detailed
simulations and analysis of our scheme against the above two
types of attacks are presented in Section VI.
C. Design Goals
From our point of view, an ideal key revocation scheme for
MANETs should have the following properties:
1) It should be fully self-organized.
2) It should be ﬂexible enough to deal with the informa-
tion that nodes collect through their own observations
and interactions with peers, and to make corresponding
responses based on results of the analysis.
3) It should be able to efﬁciently revoke keys of malicious
nodes when they show the behavior that the network
cannot tolerate.
4) It should be robust enough to thwart false statement
attacks mounted by independent adversaries or a number
of collusive adversaries.
5) It should be efﬁcient in terms of communication, com-
putation and storage overhead.5
V. PROTOCOL DESCRIPTION
In this section, we describe our key revocation scheme in
detail. We ﬁrst provide an overview of our key revocation
scheme in Section V-A. And then we present the detailed
procedure of our protocol in Sections V-B to V-F.
A. Overview
Our fully self-organized key revocation scheme is within
the framework of Bayesian data analysis. We employ Dirichlet
multinomial model and explicitly use probability to quantify
the uncertainty about nodes’ behavior. Each node in a MANET
gradually updates its knowledge about peers’ behavior through
interactions among them, and ﬁnally makes multilevel re-
sponse based on the analysis of collected information. Fur-
thermore, IBC is used to secure the information transmission
during interactions of nodes. Our scheme consists of ﬁve
parts: network initialization, neighborhood watch, authenti-
cated information dissemination, ﬁlter of false statements, and
multilevel response for malicious nodes.
In the network initialization, an external TTP ﬁrst generates
a set of secure system parameters for IBC. And then the TTP
completes the registration of nodes by preloading each node
with appropriate key materials according to the expire date and
the version number of every key. Moreover, nodes’ behavior
is classiﬁed by the TTP into three categories: good behavior
set, suspicious behavior set and malicious behavior set.
To protect the MANET from adversaries, each node over-
hears the wireless channel in the promiscuous mode, and
monitors various behavior of its one-hop neighbors at all time
with the neighborhood watch scheme. Each node records its
observation and updates the knowledge about the behavior of
all its one-hop neighbors. In addition, since nodes may change
their behavior over time, a discount factor is introduced for the
case that nodes can forget past observations gradually.
Each node not only uses direct observations to update
its knowledge about one-hop neighbors’ behavior, but also
distributes these information to all its m-hop neighbors in
some secure way. The data integrity and the authenticity of the
message origin are implemented with a keyed-hash function
where the key is derived from the bilinear pairing in a non-
interactive fashion.
After one node receives an observation report from the other
node, it ﬁrst decides whether the sender can be trusted by
checking the sender’s key status. And then the receiver veriﬁes
the authenticity of the report with the pre-shared key between
two nodes. Although merging other nodes’ observations can
accelerate the estimation about some subject’s behavior, using
all the receiving reports without hesitation will result in
potentially false statement attacks from adversaries. Hence,
we set two defence lines to thwart these attacks. Firstly, a
deviation test based on the statistical pattern of reports is used
to ﬁlter out false statements to some extent. Furthermore, if
the sender’s report passes the deviation test of the receiver,
we will use Dempster-Shafer belief theory [25] to update the
receiver’s current knowledge about the behavior of the subject
in question with this report.
In our key revocation model, each node considers that
their peers show good behavior, suspicious behavior and
malicious behavior with different probabilities. For approxi-
mating to these unknown parameters, a node uses 3-dimension
Dirichlet distribution as the prior distribution of the unknown
parameters, updates this distribution by either node’s direct
observations or its counterparts’ reports, then estimates two
parameters with posteriori expected probabilities and com-
pares these values to predeﬁned thresholds, and ﬁnally makes
multilevel response based on results of comparisons. A high
level description of our key revocation scheme is shown in the
following Algorithm 1.
Algorithm 1 Self-Organized Key Revocation for MANETs
Step 1. Network Initialization
. Generation of system parameters
. Registration of network nodes
. Classiﬁcation of node behavior
Step 2. Neighborhood Watch
. Monitor neighbors’ behavior and generate observation matrix
. Update key status of nodes with direct observations
Step 3. Authenticated Information Dissemination
. Disseminate nodes’ direct observations to all m-hop neighbors
in an authenticated way by using a keyed-hash function
Step 4. Filter of False Statements
. Filter out potentially false statements statistically
. Update key status of nodes based on Dempster-Shafer theory
Step 5. Multilevel Response for Malicious Nodes
. Revoke keys of nodes showing malicious behavior
. Cease communication with nodes showing suspicious behavior
and keep observing their behavior for further decision
B. Step 1. Network Initialization
Our scheme assumes that an external TTP bootstraps the
MANET with IBC and classiﬁes the behavior of nodes. More
speciﬁcally, the external TTP will complete the following tasks
during network initialization:
1) Generation of system parameters: The TTP generates
secure system parameters hq;k;C=Fq;G1;G2;GT;ei as de-
scribed in Section III-A. Note that we take G1 = G2 in this
paper. The TTP also generates a random master key s 2 Z¤
n
and a random generator P 2 G1, and sets his public key
Ppub = sP 2 G1. Finally, the TTP chooses a cryptographic
secure hash function: H : f0;1g¤ ! G1. The TTP publishes
all of these parameters except his master key.
2) Registration of network nodes: For the purpose of key
revocation, we use the public key format Qi = H(IDi k
date k version) for each node with identity IDi as introduced
in [12], where date is the expiry date of the key and version
is its version number. After the user IDi shows his credential
and passes the authentication of the TTP, the TTP will derive
his public key Qi and generate the corresponding ID-based
private key di = sQi.
3) Classiﬁcation of node behavior: In our model, the
state space £ includes three mutually disjoint events: good
behavior µg, suspicious behavior µs and malicious behavior
µm, namely £ = fµg;µs;µmg. To keep track of various
observable behavior in the lifetime of the MANET, the TTP
classiﬁes nodes’ behavior into three categories, namely good
behavior set Bg, suspicious behavior set Bs and malicious
behavior set Bm. The set Bg includes behavior complying6
with descriptions of the MANET protocols such as ﬁnding
a path for a packet and relaying packets for others. The set Bs
contains accidental misbehavior that temporarily and slightly
deteriorate the performance of MANETs, for example node
failures due to the network congestion or a lack of resources,
whereas intentional misbehavior, which seriously degrade the
performance of MANETs, are comprised in the set Bm. The
practical classiﬁcation of the sets Bg;Bs and Bm depends
on the network policy, the detection ability of nodes and the
concrete application scenarios.
We note that all previous key revocation schemes for
MANETs [2], [12], [18], [21], [24], [29] only classify nodes’
behavior as either good or malicious. The main motivation that
we consider suspicious behavior is based on the observation
that nodes show some misbehavior for a short time just by
accident. For example, many reasons might cause a node not
to forward packages for others such as network congestion or
malicious attacks. Therefore, when a node observes that one of
its neighbors cannot relay packages for some time, it is more
reasonable for the node to cease the communication with that
neighbor and keep observing its behavior instead of revoking
its key and excluding it from the network immediately. By
introducing suspicious behavior, we give nodes that misbe-
have by accident a chance to return to normal. As a result,
our method provides more precise estimation about nodes’
behavior than that with a simple binary behavior classiﬁcation.
Fig. 1 demonstrates possible state transitions among different
types of nodes in the lifetime of the MANET.
Since nodes’ behavior must fall into one of the above
three categories, nodes analyze and predict peers’ behav-
ior with 3-dimension Dirichlet distribution Dir(®g;®s;®m),
where (®g;®s;®m) is a parameter vector which keeps track of
nodes’ behavior appearing in sets Bg;Bs and Bm, respectively.
Good
Nodes
Suspicious
Nodes
Malicious
Nodes
good behavior
malicious behavior
malicious behavior
behavior
suspicious
good behavior
suspicious behavior
Fig. 1. State Transition Diagram among Different Types of Nodes
After the network initialization phase, each node IDi is
preloaded the following materials:
² System Parameters: hq;k;C=Fq;G1;GT;e;H;P;Ppubi.
² Public / Private Key Pair: hQi;dii.
² Behavior Classiﬁcation: Bg;Bs and Bm.
C. Step 2. Neighborhood Watch
A neighborhood watch mechanism is a localized monitoring
scheme, the main aim of which is to observe behavior of nodes
and decide whether they are conformed to descriptions of the
MANET protocols. In the neighborhood watch scheme, each
node IDi monitors all its one-hop neighbors and records three
categories of behavior each time they occur. We do not limit
types of node behavior in this work and any new type of
observable behavior can be added to the corresponding set
Bg;Bs or Bm.
Without loss of generality, we use the notation N
(1)
i to de-
note the set of one-hop neighbors of node IDi. Let N
(1)
i be the
cardinality of the set N
(1)
i . Note that N
(1)
i , and so N
(1)
i , will
be dynamically changed with time due to the mobility of nodes
in the MANET. We use the parameter vector
¡
°i
j;g;°i
j;s;°i
j;m
¢
of 3-dimension Dirichlet distribution to record node IDi’s
direct experience with the node IDj. Initially, the pa-
rameter vector is set to (Ca(µg);Ca(µs);Ca(µm)), where
(a(µg);a(µs);a(µm)) is the base rate vector and C is the prior
constant (see Section III-B). Node IDi makes one individual
observation for each node IDj 2 N
(1)
i periodically. We
set binary variables ¯i
j;g;¯i
j;s and ¯i
j;m to be 1 if the node
IDi’s observation about the node IDj’s behavior is classiﬁed
into the sets Bg;Bs or Bm, respectively, and 0 otherwise.
According to new observations about behavior of all its one-
hop neighbors, node IDi ﬁrst updates its direct experience for
each IDj 2 N
(1)
i with the following formulae:
°i
j;g := ¹°i
j;g + ¯i
j;g;
°i
j;s := ¹°i
j;s + ¯i
j;s;
°i
j;m := ¹°i
j;m + ¯i
j;m;
where the weight ¹ 2 [0;1] is a discount factor for past
observations (typically, ¹ is very close to 1). Node IDi then
updates its own observation matrix OMi with new informa-
tion. Assume that node IDi has obtained direct experience
with Ni nodes in the network up to the current time instance,
node IDi’s observation matrix is as follows:
OMi =
2
6
6 6
6
6 6
6
4
ID1 °i
1;g °i
1;s °i
1;m
. . .
. . .
. . .
. . .
IDN
(1)
i
°i
N
(1)
i ;g °i
N
(1)
i ;s °i
N
(1)
i ;m
. . .
. . .
. . .
. . .
IDNi °i
Ni;g °i
Ni;s °i
Ni;m
3
7
7 7
7
7 7
7
5
:
We use the parameter vector (®i
j;g;®i
j;s;®i
j;m) of 3-
dimension Dirichlet distribution to keep track of node IDi’s
global knowledge about node IDj’s behavior. Note that the
vector (®i
j;g;®i
j;s;®i
j;m) will be updated by both node IDi’s
direct experience and reports from other nodes. Initially, the
parameter vector is also set to (Ca(µg);Ca(µs);Ca(µm)).
After node IDi makes a direct observation about node IDj’s7
behavior, its global knowledge about node IDj’s behavior will
be updated with the following formulae:
®i
j;g := ¹®i
j;g + ¯i
j;g; (2)
®i
j;s := ¹®i
j;s + ¯i
j;s; (3)
®i
j;m := ¹®i
j;m + ¯i
j;m: (4)
Upon obtaining new information about all its one-hop
neighbors, node IDi also updates corresponding rows in
its node status matrix, NSMi, which indicates node IDi’s
opinion about key status of other nodes. Let N be the total
number of nodes in the MANET. Furthermore, we assume
that node IDi has obtained the knowledge of key status of
Mi nodes until the current time instance by observing its one-
hop neighbors and collecting information from others. Without
loss the generality, we also assume that the ﬁrst N
(1)
i rows of
NSMi include information of node IDi’s one-hop neighbors
at current time instance. Under the above assumptions, node
IDi’s node status matrix NSMi is as follows:
where ti
j and vi
j represent the expiry date and the version
number of the current public key Qj of the node IDj,
respectively. Ri
j 2 f¡1;0;1g denotes key status of node IDj
from the point of view of node IDi, and “?” means node
IDi does not obtain any information about behavior of nodes
IDk;k 2 fMi + 1;:::;Ng until the current time instance.
Note that Ri
j being ¡1, 0 or 1 indicates that the status of
node IDj’s key is “Revoked”, “Suspicious” or “Trustworthy”,
respectively. After each node IDi updates the ﬁrst N
(1)
i rows
of NSMi with the neighborhood watch scheme, it will use
the method described in Section V-F to decide whether key
status of its one-hop neighbors need to be changed. For nodes
whose key status have been marked as “Suspicious”, node IDi
will cease the communication with those nodes. Furthermore,
node IDi also keeps observing behavior of suspicious nodes
and receiving other nodes’ reports to make further decisions.
D. Step 3. Authenticated Information Dissemination
Periodically, node IDi securely disseminates its direct expe-
rience about other nodes’ behavior to all its m-hop neighbors.
Let N
(m)
i be the set of m-hop neighbors of node IDi. Node
IDi then sends its observation matrix OMi to each node
IDj 2 N
(m)
i with the following format:
omi
j = ((IDi;IDj;OMi);hKi;j((IDi;IDj;OMi)));
where Ki;j is the pre-shared key between a pair of nodes IDi
and IDj, and hKi;j(¢) is a secure hash function taking Ki;j
as the input key. With the aid of the cryptographic pairing
(see Section III-A), the pre-shared key Ki;j can be separately
calculated by nodes IDi and IDj in a non-interactive fashion
during the phase of a neighbor discovery as follows:
Ki;j = e(di;Qj) = e(sQi;Qj) = e(Qi;sQj) = e(Qi;dj);
where hQi;dii and hQj;dji are the public/private key pair
of nodes IDi and IDj, respectively. Furthermore, both data
integrity and authenticity of messages are simultaneously
guaranteed by the keyed-hash function hKi;j(¢). Therefore, an
attacker cannot change content of the observation matrix.
Note that we directly use the pairwise pre-shared secret
key Ki;j to secure communications among nodes in order to
eliminate the communication overhead of establishing session
keys. Although we can also use the lightweight ID-based key
exchange protocol proposed in [11] to generate a different
session key for each interaction, we need three-round com-
munications between two nodes in this case.
E. Step 4. Filter of False Statements
Each time node IDi receives an observation matrix om
j
i
from node IDj, node IDi will perform the following infor-
mation processing and integration algorithm shown in Fig. 2.
4.2. Verify authenticity
of messages
4.3. Filter out false
statments statistically
4.1. Check key
status of nodes
Valid?
Node Status
Matrix
Discard messages
and Stop
No
No
Yes
Yes
4.4. Update the node
status matrix
(Dempster-Shafer Theory)
Node Status
Matrix
Valid?
Observation
Matrix
Yes
Pass?
No
Fig. 2. Information Processing and Integration Algorithm
In Step 4.1, node IDi checks the status of node IDj’s key
in the node status matrix NSMi. If Ri
j = 1, then node IDi
considers node IDj to be trustworthy and continues the next
step; otherwise node IDi will discard the observation matrix
received from node IDj and stop.
In Step 4.2, node IDi veriﬁes the authenticity of the
message om
j
i using the pre-shared key Ki;j, as described in
Section V-D. If the message passes the authentication, node
IDi will further analyze reliability of node IDj’s observation8
in Step 4.3, otherwise node IDi knows that the received
message does not come from node IDj, and therefore just
discards it and stops.
Due to the possibility that nodes are compromised and
then arbitrarily report their observations under the control of
attackers, messages that node IDi receives from its counter-
parts might be spurious. Therefore, the main purpose of Step
4.3 is to avoid or mitigate the inﬂuence of false statements
from malicious nodes to some degree. In the context of key
revocation, attackers’ goals are twofold by manipulating obser-
vations of compromised nodes. On the one hand, attackers can
choose one or many good nodes and report unfairly negative
observations about victims’ behavior in order to revoke their
keys. On the other hand, if attackers know each other and
collude in MANETs, they will also propagate unfairly positive
observations about their confederates’ behavior for the purpose
of keeping their keys valid and further damaging the operation
of the network. Two efﬁcient statistical ﬁltering techniques
based on Beta distribution have been proposed to protect
Bayesian reputation systems from liars by Whitby et al. [27]
and Buchegger et al. [6], [7], respectively. Their methods are
based on the assumption that the statistical pattern of dishonest
reports is different from that of truthful ones. In addition, the
difference between these two techniques is that Whitby et al.’s
method uses quantiles of Beta distribution, whereas Buchegger
et al.’s method employs a deviation test for the compatibility of
received messages. Since our key revocation scheme is based
on the Dirichlet distribution and it is difﬁcult to deﬁne the
quantile in the multivariate case, we only generalize the idea
of the deviation test suggested by Buchegger et al. [6], [7] to
Dirichlet multinomial model in this work.
In Step 4.3, node IDi extracts orderly each row from the
node IDj’s observation matrix OMj and performs a deviation
test for the compatibility of node IDj’s observations. More
speciﬁcally, when node IDi extracts the k-th row from OMj,
it computes the following two posteriori expected probabil-
ities with which node IDk shows behavior in Bs and Bm,
respectively:
E
³
p(µs) j ~ °
j
k;~ a
´
=
°
j
k;s + Ca(µs)
C + °
j
k;g + °
j
k;s + °
j
k;m
;
E
³
p(µm) j ~ °
j
k;~ a
´
=
°
j
k;m + Ca(µm)
C + °
j
k;g + °
j
k;s + °
j
k;m
;
where ~ °
j
k =
³
°
j
k;g;°
j
k;s;°
j
k;m
´
represents node IDj’s di-
rect experience about node IDk’s behavior, and ~ a =
(a(µg);a(µs);a(µm)) is the default base rate vector. And then,
node IDi takes the row corresponding to node IDk from
its node status matrix NSMi and separately calculates two
expected probabilities based on its own knowledge about node
IDk’s behavior as follows:
E
¡
p(µs) j ~ ®i
k;~ a
¢
=
®i
k;s + Ca(µs)
C + ®i
k;g + ®i
k;s + ®i
k;m
;
E
¡
p(µm) j ~ ®i
k;~ a
¢
=
®i
k;m + Ca(µm)
C + ®i
k;g + ®i
k;s + ®i
k;m
;
where ~ ®i
k =
³
®i
k;g;®i
k;s;®i
k;m
´
denotes node IDi’s global
knowledge about node IDk’s behavior. After obtaining the
above four expected probabilities, node IDi executes the
following deviation tests:
¯
¯
¯E
¡
p(µs) j ~ ®i
k;~ a
¢
¡ E
³
p(µs) j ~ °
j
k;~ a
´¯
¯
¯ · "1;
¯
¯ ¯E
¡
p(µm) j ~ ®i
k;~ a
¢
¡ E
³
p(µm) j ~ °
j
k;~ a
´¯
¯ ¯ · "2;
where "1;"2 2 (0;1) are two deviation thresholds determined
by a system designer. If node IDj’s report about node IDk’s
behavior cannot pass the above deviation tests, node IDi
considers that report as incompatible and just discards it.
Otherwise, node IDi uses node IDj’s report to update its
knowledge about the behavior of the node IDk in Step 4.4.
Note that the simplistic information integration method
used in [7] is vulnerable to false statement attacks from an
adversary, as analyzed theoretically in [22]. Therefore, we set
up the second defense line to thwart false statement attacks
by integrating other nodes’ reports based on Dampster-Shafer
belief theory [25]. In [13], Jøsang constructed a bijective
mapping between Dirichlet distributions and Dampster-Shafer
belief functions. Therefore, we ﬁrst map node IDi’s global
knowledge and node IDj’s report about node IDk’s be-
havior (two Dirichlet distributions) to two belief distribution
functions, respectively. Then we use the technique of belief
discounting [14] to update node IDi’s opinion about node
IDk’s behavior as a result of node IDj’s report. Finally we
map the resulting belief function to a Dirichlet distribution. In
this way, the reports from different nodes are given different
weight based on their respective reputation. Suppose that
º =
C®i
j;g
¡
C + ®i
j;s + ®i
j;m
¢³
C + °
j
k;g + °
j
k;s + °
j
k;m
´
+ C®i
j;g
:
Then node IDi uses node IDj’s report to update its global
knowledge about node IDk’s behavior with the following
equations:
®i
k;g := ¹®i
k;g + º°
j
k;g;
®i
k;s := ¹®i
k;s + º°
j
k;s;
®i
k;m := ¹®i
k;m + º°
j
k;m:
F. Step 5. Multilevel Response for Malicious Nodes
Each time node IDi updates its knowledge about node
IDk’s behavior in the MANET by either the neighborhood
watch scheme or other nodes’ reports, it checks whether
IDk’s behavior are still within boundaries of its misbehavior
tolerance and the status of node IDk’s key needs to be
changed. Note that node IDk’s key status Ri
k in the node
status matrix NSMi directly determines how node IDi treats
node IDk.
To minimize the squared-error loss for the deviation from
the true probabilities p(µm) and p(µs) with which node IDk
shows respectively malicious and suspicious behavior, we
choose posteriori expected probabilities E
¡
p(µm) j ~ ®i
k;~ a
¢
and
E
¡
p(µs) j ~ ®i
k;~ a
¢
as estimators as usually done. As soon as9
node IDi obtains the updated vector ~ ®i
k describing node
IDk’s behavior, it will response as follows:
1. Node IDi computes the posteriori expected probability
E
¡
p(µm) j ~ ®i
k;~ a
¢
. If E
¡
p(µm) j ~ ®i
k;~ a
¢
¸ trev, i.e., it
is equal to or larger than a predetermined revocation
threshold trev, node IDi sets Ri
k = ¡1 and stops. Other-
wise it goes to the next step. Here, Ri
k = ¡1 denotes that
node IDi believes that node IDk has been compromised
and revokes its key. Once node IDi revokes node IDk’s
key, it will cease any communication with node IDk
until node IDk receives a new key from the TTP.
2. Node IDi calculates the posteriori expected probability
E
¡
p(µs) j ~ ®i
k;~ a
¢
. If E
¡
p(µs) j ~ ®i
k;~ a
¢
¸ tk
sus, i.e., it
is equal to or larger than a predetermined suspicion
threshold tk
sus, node IDi sets Ri
k = 0. Note that Ri
k = 0
means that node IDi suspects that node IDk has been
compromised, and so node IDi will shield itself against
suspicious behavior of node IDk by terminating the
communication with it. Furthermore, to make further
decision, node IDi continues collecting information
to update its knowledge about node IDk’s behavior.
Possible state transitions of the suspicious node IDk are
described with dash lines in Fig. 1. Note that three cases
might happen for node IDk: a) Node IDk just shows
suspicious behavior by accident, and therefore behaves
normally after a short time. In this case, it will become
a good node and be trusted by node IDi again. b) Node
IDk continues behaving suspiciously. In this case, all
nodes will ﬁnally mark node IDk to be suspicious and
terminate to communicate with it. Hence, node IDk
will be evicted from the network. c) Node IDk shows
malicious behavior. In this case, the key of node IDk
will be revoked once the posterior expected probability
E
¡
p(µs) j ~ ®i
k;~ a
¢
reaches the revocation threshold. In
addition, to react faster than before when node IDk
behaves suspiciously again in the above case a), node
IDi also decreases the suspicion threshold of node IDk
as follows:
tk
sus := »tk
sus;
where » 2 (0;1) is a fading factor of the suspicion
threshold of a node. Furthermore, we also introduce a
parameter tmax which denotes the maximum number
of state transitions between good nodes and suspicious
nodes (see Fig. 1). Once the state transition has appeared
tmax times for node IDk, node IDi will revoke its key
immediately by setting Ri
k = ¡1 and terminate any
further communication with node IDk until node IDk
receives a new key from the TTP.
VI. PERFORMANCE EVALUATION
In this section, we evaluate the performance of our key
revocation scheme through extensive simulations, the goal
of which is to demonstrate attack-resistant properties of our
scheme under the existence of independent adversaries and
collusive adversaries, respectively. Furthermore, we also show
the advantages of classifying nodes’ behavior into three cate-
gories over the simple binary differentiation.
A. Simulation Setup
we have implemented our key revocation scheme with the
C programming language on Microsoft Visual Studio platform.
The performance evaluations are based on the simulations of
100 wireless nodes that form a MANET over a square (600 m
£ 600 m) space and interact 100 times. We use the “random
waypoint” model [4] to simulate the mobility of nodes in the
MANET. For each node, We set the maximum speed as 10
m/s and maximum travel time as 20 s. The communication
range of each node is set to be 100 m. Furthermore, we
assume that the base rate vector ~ a = (a(µg);a(µs);a(µm))
is (0:6;0:25;0:15), which denotes the prior uncertainty that
honest nodes show good behavior, suspicious behavior and
malicious behavior, respectively. We also assume that the
discount factor ¹ is 0:999, both deviation thresholds "1 and "2
are 0:1, the revocation threshold trev is 0:2, and the suspicious
threshold tk
sus is set to be 0:3. The simulation is repeated for
a number of communication sessions. In each session, each
node moves to a new position and observe the behavior of its
neighbors. Moreover, in some sessions nodes also ﬂood their
observations to all m-hop neighbors.
To simulate false statement attacks from adversaries, before
running the simulation, we randomly select a certain fraction
of the network population as suspicious nodes and malicious
nodes, respectively. More speciﬁcally, we assume that 20%
of all network nodes will show suspicious behavior for dif-
ferent reasons. Among those suspicious nodes, we further
assume that half of them, named type-I suspicious nodes,
show suspicious behavior just by accident (for example, a
node drops packages due to the network congestion.) and
behave normally after some time (due to the improvements
of the network environment), whereas the other half of suspi-
cious nodes, called type-II suspicious nodes, show suspicious
behavior followed by malicious behavior. Note that type-I
suspicious nodes are basically good and therefore record their
observations honestly, whereas type-II suspicious nodes are
basically malicious and so we assume that they record a
suspicious behavior or a malicious behavior with probability
1
2, respectively, for selected attack objects in each commu-
nication session. Considering two types of suspicious nodes
in the simulations enables us to demonstrate the following
two cases (also see Fig. 1): a) Type-I suspicious nodes can
get trustworthy again by good nodes after they are marked
as suspicious; b) Keys of type-II suspicious nodes will be
ﬁnally revoked. Furthermore, we also change the fraction of
malicious nodes, ranging from 10% to 30%. Based on the
above parameters and assumptions, we simulate two attack
scenarios described in Section IV-B.
B. False Statement Attacks by Independent Adversaries
In this section, we evaluate the impact of false statement
attacks launched by independent adversaries on our key re-
vocation scheme. In this attack scenario, we further assume
that each adversary selects 10% of all network nodes as attack
objects, randomly and independently. These adversaries record
a malicious behavior for the selected attack objects in each10
communication session and ﬂood their accusations to all one-
hop neighbors each 5 communication sessions.
Note that we are concerned with the inﬂuence of false
accusation attacks on good nodes’ opinion about the key status
of other nodes. Therefore, we randomly sample two good
nodes, a type-I suspicious node, a type-II suspicious node, and
a malicious node. We then keep track of the opinion of one
good node about the key status of other four nodes. Figure 3
shows the attack-resistance properties of our key revocation
scheme against independent adversaries when their population
increases from 10% to 30%. Although we randomly sample
several nodes, we would like to point that the opinion of other
good nodes follows the similar curves as Figure 3.
Figure 3(a) describes a good node’s opinion about the key
status of the other good node. We note that from the point of
view of a good node the posterior expected probabilities that
the other good node shows suspicious behavior and malicious
behavior never exceed the corresponding suspicious threshold
and revocation threshold. Therefore, the keys of good nodes
never get wrongly revoked by other good nodes under the false
statement attacks by independent adversaries.
For a type-I suspicious node, Figure 3(b) shows that from
the point of view of a good node the posterior expected
probability that a type-I suspicious node shows malicious
behavior is always less than the revocation threshold. Hence,
the key of the type-I suspicious node will not be revoked
unless it have altered their states between good and suspicious
for tmax times (also see Fig. 1). In particular, when that
node show suspicious behavior followed by good behavior, the
key of that node will be ﬁrst marked as suspicious once the
posterior expected probability E
³
p(µs) j ~ ®
i;new
k ;~ a
´
exceeds
the suspicious threshold. Then that node becomes trustworthy
by the good node again after it behaves normally for some
time. Note that if one uses the simple binary differentiation
for nodes’ behavior, the keys of type-I suspicious nodes will
be revoked immediately. However, the type-I suspicious nodes
only misbehave temporarily and are basically good in our
simulations. Therefore, our scheme provides more accurate
estimation about nodes’ behavior than that in the binary case.
For a type-II suspicious node who show suspicious behavior
followed by malicious behavior, Figure 3(c) indicates that a
good node will ﬁrst mark its key as suspicious when the
posterior expected probability E
³
p(µs) j ~ ®
i;new
k ;~ a
´
exceeds
the suspicious threshold. After gathering enough evidence
about malicious behavior of the type-II suspicious node, the
good node will ﬁnally revoke its key. In addition, Figure 3(d)
shows that a good node can correctly revoke the key of a
malicious node in the presence of independent adversaries.
From the simulation results in Figure 3, we note that our key
revocation scheme can efﬁciently isolate malicious nodes from
the network and also demonstrates strong robustness against
the false statement attacks from independent adversaries even
in a highly hostile environment (10% type-II suspicious nodes
and 30% malicious nodes).
C. False Statement Attacks by Collusive Adversaries
In this section, we study whether false statement attacks
from collusive adversaries will affect our key revocation
scheme. To this end, we assume that all malicious nodes
choose 10% good nodes as common targets instead of ran-
domly and independently selecting attack objects. In this
attack scenario, all malicious nodes not only record malicious
behavior for the selected 10% good nodes but also record good
behavior for other malicious nodes in each communication
session. Furthermore, they also propagate their false statements
to all one-hop neighbors each 5 communication sessions.
Here, we check the opinion of a good node about the
key status of other nodes under the collusive false statement
attacks. Similar to the case of independent adversaries, we
randomly select two good nodes (one of them is the attack
object of the collusive adversaries), a type-I suspicious node,
a type-II suspicious node, and a malicious node again, and
keep track of the opinion of a good node. Figure 4 shows
the attack-resistance properties of our key revocation scheme
against collusive adversaries when the number of malicious
nodes increases from 10% to 30%. We want to emphasize
again that in our key revocation scheme each node has its own
view about the key status of other nodes. Although we observe
that all good nodes have similar opinion about other nodes’
key status in our simulations, it is impossible for us to show
all good nodes’ opinion due to space limitations. Therefore,
we randomly sample several nodes from different categories.
In Figure 4(a), we note that false accusations from collusive
adversaries cannot affect the good node’s opinion about the
key status of the victim they select. The posterior expected
probability that the victim shows malicious behavior is always
less than the revocation threshold. The reason is that good
nodes have accumulated good reputation in the early commu-
nication sessions and the false accusations from adversaries
cannot pass the deviation test set by good nodes. Therefore,
the false accusations will be ﬁltered by good nodes and the
keys of good nodes will not be wrongly revoked even in the
presence of collusive adversaries.
Similar to the case of independent adversaries, Figure 4(b)
shows that the key of a type-I suspicious node will not be
revoked by the good node unless the number of times that
it changes its states between good and suspicious amount
to tmax (see Fig. 1). Furthermore, if the key of the type-
I suspicious node is marked as suspicious due to temporary
suspicious behavior, it can be trusted again by a good node
after the posterior expected probability E
³
p(µs) j ~ ®
i;new
k ;~ a
´
is less than the suspicious threshold. Different from type-I
suspicious nodes, malicious behavior of a type-II suspicious
node are ﬁnally identiﬁed by the good node and therefore it
will revoke the key of the type-II suspicious node as shown
in Figure 4(c). Figure 4(b) and 4(c) demonstrate how a good
node responses suspicious behavior in our scheme. While a
good node showing suspicious behavior temporarily can get
trustworthy again by other good nodes, the real malicious
nodes will be evicted from the network. Moreover, false
statement attacks from collusive adversaries have no inﬂuence
on type-I and type-II suspicious nodes since the attack objects11
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(b) A good node’s opinion about the key status of a type-I
suspicious node
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(c) A good node’s opinion about the key status of a type-II
suspicious node
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(d) A good node’s opinion about the key status of a malicious node
Fig. 3. Simulation Results for False Statement Attacks by Independent Adversaries
of adversaries are good nodes in our simulations.
Figure 4(d) shows that the key of the malicious node can
still be revoked by the good node even if malicious nodes
praise each other. The reason is that after the good node have
established the bad reputation for the malicious node in the
early communication sessions the false praise from the friends
of the malicious node is very difﬁcult to pass the deviation test
of good nodes. Moreover, even if the false statement can pass
the deviation test, this information only has slight inﬂuence on
the opinion of the good node because of the use of Dampster-
Shafter theory (see Section V-E), which gives less weight to
the reports from malicious nodes than those from good nodes.
The simulation results in Figure 4 demonstrate that false
statements from collusive malicious nodes cannot affect good
nodes’ opinion about the key status of other nodes. Most false
statements are ﬁltered by the deviation tests of good nodes.
For those false statements which pass the deviation tests,
the information integration technique based on Dampster-
Shafter theory guarantees that the false statements only have
slight inﬂuence on good nodes’ opinion. Therefore, our key
revocation can still perform well even under the false statement
attacks from collusive adversaries.
VII. CONCLUSION
MANETs pose formidable challenges on the issue of key
revocation due to lack of infrastructure and centralized servers.
This work explores a novel self-organized approach to solve
the key revocation problem in MANETs. Firmly rooted in
statistics, our key revocation scheme provides a theoretically
sound basis for nodes analyzing and predicting peers’ behavior
based on their own observations and other nodes’ reports.
Furthermore, classifying nodes’ behavior into three categories
not only provides network designers more ﬂexibility for var-
ious application scenarios, but also enables nodes to make
multilevel response according to the severity of malicious
behavior. In addition, our key revocation scheme is designed
to provide strong defense against false statement attacks from
independent and collusive adversaries. The effectiveness and
attack-resistance properties of our scheme are conﬁrmed by
extensive simulation results.12
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Fig. 4. Simulation Results for False Statement Attacks by Collusive Adversaries
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